

**Globalization, Uncertainty and Women's Mid-Career Life Courses:
A Theoretical Framework¹**

**Heather Hofmeister
Melinda Mills
Hans-Peter Blossfeld**

<http://www.uni-bamberg.de/sowi/soziologie-i/globalife>

**Faculty of Social and Economic Science
Department of Sociology I
Otto-Friedrich University of Bamberg
Lichtenhaidestrasse 11
P.O. Box 1549
D-96045 Bamberg
Germany**

¹ The authors would like to thank members of the GLOBALIFE project for detailed comments on a previous version of this chapter.

Globalization, Uncertainty and Women's Mid-Career Life Courses: A Theoretical Framework¹

Heather Hofmeister*
Melinda Mills**
Hans-Peter Blossfeld*

1. INTRODUCTION

Recent economic and institutional changes, attributed to globalization, have altered women's relationships to the other members of their families, to the wider community, to the labor force, and, indeed, to the world stage. These changes include the internationalization of markets, intensified competition, accelerated spread of networks and knowledge via new technologies; and the rising importance of markets and their dependence on random shocks. Together they generate economic uncertainty and this uncertainty, in turn, changes women's relationship to the labor market and all other related institutions. This volume seeks to understand the consequences of globalization over time for the employment trajectories of mid-life course women in Europe and North America in cross-national, comparative perspective.

The rising economic uncertainty of the globalizing world, coupled with trends such as longer life expectancies, greater norms and costs encouraging smaller family sizes, and increased levels of education for women, has increased women's investment in paid employment and thus has fundamentally altered women's relationship to family life.

Labor force attachment is of special interest because in recent decades there has been a growing concern that large structural changes attributed to globalization have affected the quality and stability of jobs in industrialized countries, with stable jobs replaced by short-term, unstable jobs with poor wages, skill requirements, working benefits and conditions (Mills and Blossfeld Forthcoming-b). For example, many countries have actively pursued strategies of privatizing services and products that have traditionally been provided by the state. Often such privatization strategies are requirements of 'structural re-adjustment loans' from organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, markets have not always emerged to take over the functions of the state, often because private firms lack the ability to insure against certain risks that the state can more easily take on. As a result, some services and products are simply no longer available or are scarce and expensive. This implies that the burden of this outcome of privatization must then be borne by individuals (Stiglitz 2002). If states and firms do not protect individuals in this contingent and volatile workforce, risk may be spread across all classes and groups of society (Beck 1992; Beck 1997/2000). As individuals and their families bear more personal uncertainties and risks under these global transformations, families adapt accordingly.

Individuals therefore must prepare themselves for a flexible labor market with fast and frequent changes among and between jobs and joblessness, constantly adjusting in order to

¹ The authors would like to thank members of the GLOBALIFE project for detailed comments on a previous version of this chapter.

*Globalife Project, Faculty of Sociology, Otto Friedrich University Bamberg, Germany

** Department of Social Research Methodology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands

remain employed (Auer and Cazes 2000). Women have often been among the most flexible and adaptive members of families, taking over tasks and roles as needed to ensure the survival and continuity of the group (Moen 1994; Spitze 1988). Some of this adaptation is a product of women's historic workplace location at home due to maternal caregiving, giving women the possibility also to adopt additional home-based tasks such as elderly caregiving and domestic work. But, as has long been true with paternal caregiving, maternal caregiving also increasingly includes providing economic or material resources. While we recognize that all mothers are women yet not all women are mothers, we pay special attention to the constraints of mothers, because 70 to 95 percent of women in the countries studied in this volume eventually become mothers; thus, the policies and practices that affect mothers have a bearing on the majority of women's lives.

Despite the rising need in many societies for female earnings to supplement or replace male earnings under volatile economic circumstances for families, and despite decades of legislation designed to protect women from job discrimination and lower pay for equal work, in reality women in most countries are still more likely to work in part time, flexible, insecure, service-sector occupations with less security, lower pay, and lower skills requirements than their husbands' jobs have (Grusky 2001). As globalization converts formerly secure employment trajectories to more insecure and contingent ones, the consequences for women's employment are all the more in question.

Women have typically held more flexible -- and thus unstable and low quality -- jobs, even before the globalization discussion emerged. These large structural adjustments and the move to labor market flexibility motivated by globalization actually mean that employment for all workers has become feminized, fitting a more traditional female, contingent model of employment (Standing 1989). The influx of women into the labor market could also suggest that women are replacing men on the job and that more work is converted to the types of jobs and working conditions that were traditionally the domain of women. Another possibility is that the increased creation of part-time jobs is attracting women with a marginal attachment to the labor force who previously did not work for pay at all.

Our research will shed light on the roles that country-specific institutions and policies in various OECD-type societies play in mediating the influence of globalization on the labor market attachment of women, and, consequently, women's unpaid family care.

Focusing only on women's mid-career intragenerational job mobility is important because the majority of previous research on social mobility has primarily examined *intergenerational* mobility, particularly of men. Comparative research on *intragenerational* mobility has been rare (Mills and Blossfeld Forthcoming-a). In addition, the classic view of stratification derives women's social position from her husband or father's position (Giddens 1973; Parsons 1953). Yet recent empirical research shows that the mobility experience of women differs significantly from that of men (Aschaffenburg 1995; Giddens 1973; Parsons 1953; Rosenfeld 1990; Rosenfeld 1992). In comparison to men, women's career trajectories are generally flatter. Instead of moving from lower to higher prestige jobs with the accumulation of age and labor market experience, as their male counterparts do, women often begin and end their careers in the middle ranges of the occupational prestige scales (Rosenfeld 1992). And, despite the dramatic increases of women's labor force participation since the 1970s in many countries, women are still segregated into 'feminized' occupations, often characterized by higher turnover, less human capital required, and lower levels of authority, autonomy, power and earnings granted (Aschaffenburg 1995; Bielby and Baron 1986; Rosenfeld 1990). As with the study of career mobility of men in volume two of the GLOBALIFE series, this volume examines mid-career women.

This chapter gives a review of concepts and theories that will be used in the later chapters of this volume. Section 1.2 defines our conceptualization of the term globalization and introduces each dimension of our definition: the macro-level processes of internationalization of markets, intensification of global competition, the impact of new technologies, and the rising importance of markets. Section 1.3 explains the role of national institutions such as employment relations, educational systems, welfare regimes, family systems, and cultural norms in adjudicating the impact of globalization on women's lives. Finally, through all these institutions, individuals are in a position to make decisions that reflect not only their historical and institutional context, but also their values, attitudes, and needs. Section 1.4 provides a way of framing how these processes are experienced at an individual level and offers a series of hypothesized relationships between women's employment and globalization. The data and methods used in this volume are then briefly discussed in section 1.5, followed by a summary of the book (section 1.6).

2. DEFINING GLOBALIZATION

As Mills and Blossfeld (Forthcoming) elaborate, this series is unique in setting a specific definition of globalization. Here we briefly summarize the approach used in volumes 1 and 2 and apply it to women's labor force experiences. Rather than seeing globalization as purely economic or purely theoretical, our approach defines globalization with four interrelated structural shifts: 1) the internationalization of markets, 2) intensified competition, 3) accelerated spread of networks and knowledge via new technologies; and, 4) the rising importance of markets and their dependence on random shocks.² Our study of the effects of globalization is restricted to the post-war era. We concede that globalization has a longer historical trajectory, but an examination of the changes in women's labor force participation is most profitable only for the most recent wave of globalization.

Globalization generates uncertainty at the individual and household level. Women may be the family members most likely to experience the consequences of this uncertainty in their own lives because they tend to be the economic "safety valve" in many families. Although we recognize macro-level mechanisms as generating globalization, we must make a series of assumptions before inferring direct causation between globalization and women's life courses. Thus, our 'bridge' or 'middle-range' theoretical approach allows testable hypotheses at the individual level. Recent global shifts are influencing the level of uncertainty at the individual and household level through the filter of institutions including employment relations, educational systems, welfare regimes, and family systems.

Some scholars expect that globalization creates global integration, merging of national institutional regimes, or the diminishing importance of individual nation-states. We do not. We recognize that the path-dependent development of country-specific institutions impact how women experience globalization (Mayer 2001), and that this path-dependence, as well as long-standing cultural differences in value orientations and institutions, will guarantee that nations, and their residents, experience globalization in different ways over time.

Our approach to the study of globalization is unique in three key ways. This project, and this volume, employs empirical methods, providing an opportunity to test whether inequality and stratification are fragmenting, increasing, or entrenching within and among industrialized nations. Second, we move beyond the macro-level study of globalization to bring the individual into the equation. We recognize the agency of the individual in adapting to processes of globalization; in fact, this is precisely what we study. Third, and to reiterate the

² Readers can refer to Volumes 1 and 2 of this series for a more detailed discussion of how our definition of globalization is embedded within a broader theoretical discussion of the term, which we do not elaborate upon again in this chapter.

point made above, we view nation-specific institutions as central mediators of globalization's effects on individual life courses. Nation-specific institutions, therefore, are transforming, not losing importance.

The following sections elaborate the key components of globalization.

2.1. Internationalization of Markets

First, *internationalization of markets and the subsequent decline of national borders* are connected with changes in laws, institutions or practices that make transactions easier or less expensive across national borders. This easing of transactions results in an intensification of innovation and an increased rate of economic and social change that has led some social theorists to label globalization as a 'juggernaut' or a 'runaway world' (Giddens 2000). Another consequence is the emergence of global formal agreements and interest groups, which either formally or informally act as pressure groups on governments to enact policies that improve the efficiency and functioning of markets.

The internationalization of markets is identified through several trends that have been an increasingly active force shaping world trade. One is the growth of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), which alone account for two-thirds of world trade and exert a powerful influence on national and worldwide economic policies, as well as having a profound influence on the workplaces of millions of individuals. The second trend is the growth of foreign investment. Money travels across borders as investors seek new and growing markets. This means that individuals and firms who invest in markets outside of their home countries are increasingly involved with and affected by the economic and political decisions taking place in other nations. Finally, the modification of trade regulations and treaties to facilitate free movement of money, goods, and people is changing the flow of goods and services worldwide. Nations compete with each other to be a more favorable business climate in order to attract capital investments and spending. For example, NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) has expanded the job opportunities of some citizens while eliminating available work for those in other employment sectors. The formation of the European Union has widened the employment possibilities for European citizens and simplified the transfer of goods across borders.

Innovative workplaces at the cusp of globalizing trends seek a workforce that is flexible so that their human resources can expand and contract as the market requires. These firms are likely to see women as a talent reserve, to be called upon in times of economic expansion (Rudolph and Grüning 1993). In addition, the less rigid organizational structures of companies whose workplaces are in flux are well suited to women's organizational and work style that is based more on collaboration and consensus rather than chains of command and authority (Riegraf 1996).

We anticipate that the internationalization of markets will have several impacts on women's mobility patterns. First, changes in the labor market increase demand for flexibility and new skills. The consequence is that women with the appropriate educational qualifications will be able to adapt to shifting job circumstances, requirements, and conditions. Due to the increased opportunities for re-training and re-entry, we contend that women's absence from the labor market will be less penalizing for re-entry.

The internationalization of markets leads directly to the second component of globalization, intensified competition.

2.2.Intensified Competition

A second feature of globalization is the *intensification of competition*, among firms as well as nation-states. These institutions are competing for cheap labor, broader markets, and highly skilled workers. As capital and labor are increasingly mobile, this mobility forces firms and national economies to adjust.

In order to improve the functioning of markets and add a competitive advantage, governments relax their regulation of economic activities through the deregulation of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). Previous research has shown that when there is less EPL, such as in liberal regimes like the United States and the United Kingdom, companies have fewer constraints for downsizing, lay-offs and the introduction of further labor market flexibility measures (Auer and Cazes 2000). Second, the shift to liberalization, or the reliance on the price mechanism to coordinate economic activities, often means a transfer of enterprises that were previously under public ownership to the private sphere (i.e., privatization).

The intensified competition has distributed work worldwide in different ways. Firms leave regions where their costs of employment are high and relocate in regions where costs of employment are low. For example, textile manufacturing has shifted from North America to Latin America and East and Southeast Asia. Information processing has shifted from the U.S. to Ireland, and steel manufacturing has left Northern Europe and North America for Eastern Europe and Asia.

While money and goods do transfer across borders more rapidly than ever before, people may not relocate so readily. Therefore, workers in some regions are finding their industries are leaving and their training is obsolete, while workers in other regions are realizing new employment from opportunities. This means that some regions are experiencing surges in employment opportunities in traditional women's industries and occupations while other regions experience loss of jobs. The consequence is that the effects of this part of the globalization phenomenon are likely to be experienced differently throughout the world.

In order for firms to expand their sales in the face of intense competition, they have to increase demand for their products. Lowering the price is one key way to increase demand. Prices get lower primarily by reducing the cost of production, especially labor. This reduction is achievable in several ways, including mechanizing the labor so that fewer workers are required, getting more productivity out of the same workforce, or paying workers lower wages for the same amount of productivity. Many firms use a combination of these to achieve greater market share.

Industrialization principles such as just-in-time manufacturing (which means goods are produced as demand warrants instead of companies keeping an inventory of products on hand for the expected demand) are being applied to the labor force, with periods of high demand prompting employers to expand the labor force temporarily through short term contractual labor. Companies thus reduce their commitment to their workers, bringing in workers only as needed and letting them go when demand for their labor subsides. Such a practice is good for the companies' profit margin, but it increases employment uncertainty for the workers dramatically. The Catch-22 for the worldwide marketplace where short-term temporary contracts are the norm is that this growing labor force employed in such uncertain ways is also the market for products and services. As job uncertainty increases, consumers often cope by reducing their consumption. And this decline in consumption reduces firms' earnings. So firms adjust by reducing their commitment to their labor force even more.

We expect that increased competition will urge firms to compete to lower labor costs and will do this partly by reducing benefits for more marginal workers such as those in part-time positions, starting a "race to the bottom" (Mills 2004). Benefits given to women for

caregiving responsibilities (paid time off, job security, flexible or reduced hours) may decrease, reducing the quality of jobs available for women. This phenomenon may have negative consequences for women's job security and earnings as it does for men, or the new job insecurity might have one advantage for women: women who are negotiating multiple commitments may appreciate the flexibility of the new labor market because they may not be penalized for exiting and reentering the labor force.

The sector of employment may be a key factor in determining how women are sheltered from risk, with those employed in the public sector 'relatively isolated from the operation of market forces' (Esping-Andersen 1993). Employment in the public sector is farther removed than the private sector from the impetus of productivity and profitability of global competition.

There is a counterview to the "race to the bottom" that employers engage in to obtain cheaper work conditions via reductions in employee and environmental protection and regulation. The perception that the workforce could or might relocate to more optimal work climates may prompt lawmakers and industries to try to keep their talent pool from departing for more favorable environments through increased job benefits and more worker protections. These incentives will tend to favor highly skilled, highly educated workers, men and women alike. Thus such a phenomenon may serve to widen existing inequalities in earnings and benefits by occupation or sector (Reich 1991).

2.3. Spread of Global Networks and Knowledge via Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)

One of the stimuli for this globalization of markets and intensified competition is the sophisticated technology that is increasingly and ever more inexpensively available worldwide. The internet and satellite communication make the transfer of information fast and cheap. Cellular technology and widespread computing resources, including microcomputers and the internet, increase the communication options for people and alters the relationship of people to their workplace. Delivery of goods is also becoming cheaper, as firms use larger freighters and more efficient systems for conveying those goods across large expanses of the globe. All of these technological changes are influencing the kinds of work that are available, the way work is done, and the relationship between the employer and the employee. Thus a third feature of globalization is the *spread of global networks of people and firms linked by information and communication technologies (ICTs)*. These technologies impact the scope, intensity, velocity and impact of transformations and allow a faster diffusion of information over long distances in addition to providing people with a common international standard of comparison. They likewise alter communications to the extent that they render physical space and distance less relevant.

The integration of new technologies in the workplace means that workers with more skills, and the "right" skills, will fare better in the new 'knowledge-based economy' (Gera and Massé 1996). Conversely, new technologies not only create positions for new knowledge workers, but can also be used to increase efficiency through the mechanization of low-skilled positions and thus create redundancy for workers from unskilled manual classes. The growth in ICT affects individuals' access to information about the labor market itself. For example, the growth of online job markets such as Monsterboard, which operates in 22 countries and lists more than a million job openings on the Internet, demonstrates that many job markets are migrating online. This instantaneous access to information may foster greater job mobility.

This technological transformation has several consequences for women's labor market experiences. First, new technologies may provide more flexible working conditions such as telecommuting and flexible work hours, which can facilitate women's dual roles as caregivers and workers (Mills 2004; Mills and Blossfeld Forthcoming-b). On the other hand, new

technologies may tighten the labor market (Beck 2000). In some economies, this means there is less work for unskilled labor, much of which is female labor. New technologies may also discriminate against non-technologically proficient people, who may be more likely to be women. Return to employment may be difficult and require new training, which may be expensive in time or financial costs.

Technologies make it possible for firms to hire labor in countries with lower payroll and benefits expenses. This means that globalization's effects may provide more employment opportunities for women in lower-cost, lower-welfare-benefit countries, but less employment for women in countries with higher levels of welfare benefits and firm costs.

2.4. The Rising Importance of Markets and their Dependence on Random Shocks

Finally, globalization is inherently related to the *rise in the importance of markets*. Not only do we experience the intensification of processes, but globalized markets also increasingly take the lead and set the standards to which individuals, firms and nations then strive to adhere. The escalating dynamics and volatility of outcomes of globalizing markets makes it more difficult for individuals, firms, and governments to predict the future and to make choices between different alternatives and strategies. This increasing uncertainty then results in the need for firms and governments to leave their options 'open' and thus promotes labor market flexibility and the shifting of risk from the firm and the government to the individual. Firms react by implementing various measures of labor market flexibility (e.g., numerical, outsourcing, functional, wage, temporal), which vary depending on the institutional context (Mills and Blossfeld Forthcoming-b). The emphasis on job security and job permanence found in many European countries is virtually unknown in the deregulated North American environment, which is built on the premises of flexibility, market economic relations and a non-interventionist state (Mills 2004).

3. INSTITUTIONAL FILTERS OF GLOBALIZATION

Institutions are central to understanding how individuals' options and decisions are shaped by their contexts. Institutions affect the costs of having and raising children, the economic value of family responsibilities, and the choices available between family activities and paid employment. Relevant institutions that shape women's labor market mobility include employment systems, education systems that regulate the transition into the workplace, the welfare regime with its particular labor market and family policies, and family systems and arrangements, which include cultural norms.

3.1. Women's Relationship to Employment Structures

Recent shifts towards globalization are experienced more directly by outsiders of the labor market (Mills, Blossfeld, and Klijzing Forthcoming). Unpaid labor in the home and paid labor in secondary labor markets or informal "black" markets are outside of traditional employment protections. Thus women, especially women who have children, are often outsiders in most labor markets, even as their unpaid labor at home has made possible men's insider labor market status and uninterrupted employment. Outsiders in a paid labor market tend to experience less security, lower wages, and fewer benefits. As women in some countries are increasingly likely to be the sole breadwinners for their families, this outsider status has profound repercussions for the lives and health of children and women, as well as for the relationships between women and men. Few secure jobs that pay a living wage with benefits are available to women that also allow for entry and exit due to childbearing, but this varies by country. The kind of work available in the country, region, or industry may or may not be compatible with the demands from the family sphere.

However, we still need to answer the more poignant question of *why* women have been relegated to this secondary or outsider flexible labor market position. The answer likely lies in the work-family linkage and the cultural and structural requirement for women to be the family members responsible for combining employment and care giving within a particular institutional context. On the one hand, labor market flexibility answers a demand for flexibility that comes from women who want or need to combine work and the family. On the other hand, this very demand for job flexibility stems from institutional constraints such as lack of childcare or adequate parental or sickness leave to care for children or other family members. Or, women may engage in labor market flexibility not because they want to or need to, but because these are the only positions women can obtain (Mills 2004).

We ask whether globalization is increasing the individualization of women's life courses. Are women's life courses inevitably going to look more like men's life courses under these processes? Or will more women become involved in the paid labor market, but in the same kinds of work in which women have always participated? If there is substantive change in women's labor market participation, globalization could direct that movement either toward parity with men's careers or toward an even more segregated, insider-outsider market. Do women in the labor market now participate because they want to, or because they have to, or are these two motivations increasingly indistinguishable? Are there differences in women's labor market participation between countries that indicate either institutional barriers or pathways to paid employment? How are the answers to these questions being transformed by globalization? Evidence suggests that globalization is causing more unemployment, more flexibility, more in- and outflows of workers, and overall more labor market change in some employment sectors (see Volumes 1 and 2, this series). These phenomena, on the one hand, may be welcome for women because they increase the availability of flexible jobs, which are useful when balancing paid work and family responsibilities. But on the other hand, these changes jeopardize the security of their male breadwinner. For example, dependence on public sector employment for women is particularly strong in Sweden (see chapter x). If the Swedish public sector shrinks, women's employment opportunities will also diminish.

Obstacles to women's employment may be many. Institutions may not permit the kind of employment women need or want. At the highest level, the welfare regimes may discourage particular kinds of employment that are most desirable to women through taxes, labor laws, training regulations, and lack of alternative institutional supports (such as child care). Discriminatory hiring and payment practices may discourage women from working for pay or from gaining access to the kinds of jobs they want. Even, or especially, the presence of maternity leave policies discourage employers from investing in a female labor force because the costs of hiring women who interrupt their jobs for caregiving are higher than the costs of hiring workers who do not interrupt. The more generous the leave policies, the more expensive women are to hire. Firms may employ statistical discrimination against all women, which means that even women who do not plan to interrupt their employment are suspected of being likely to interrupt, and so they are passed over for promotions or relegated to lower-paid, lower-status work.

Within institutions, women are often seen as women first and workers second, which can interfere with the authority accorded to them on the job. The sexualization of women and the prevalence of expectations for women to do emotion work (caring for coworkers, details, environment) while men do tasks with more authority and visibility can also undermine women's authority and credibility at work (Coser 1991; Hochschild 1983; Huff 1991).

Additionally, the labor force is a central socialization principle and a central organizing structure of welfare regimes. Other kinds of work, especially unpaid caregiving work, are marginalized, for example exclusion from the sum of a nation's gross domestic product. When women's participation in the labor force -- the key organizing institution in society -- is

made expensive and exceptional, and when tax structures and the absence of institutionalized child care reinforce the exclusion of women or mothers from full time employment, even women who would prefer to be employed may find it structurally impossible.

3.2. Women and the Educational System

Educational systems have an influence on women's labor force participation by whether women are tracked into certain occupational training paths that reduce their overall earnings potential or given encouragement and opportunity to attain high-earnings and high-prestige occupational tracks. Women's long-term labor market participation and success is partly dependent on whether educational systems allow women to return for additional training and skill-updating after family responsibilities have lessened to compete in the labor force on equal footing with men and women who have continuous careers. Some educational systems have excellent "off-time" training programs, whereas other systems make little or no allowance for adult education.

3.3. Women's Relationship to Welfare Regimes

Welfare regimes are a crucial organizing characteristic because institutional supports available in some countries and not in others influence the ways that women and their partners make decisions about the timing, spacing, and number of births, the ability to return to work after giving birth, and the level of trust women and men can put in institutions (if any exist) that care for their children while they are at work. Institutions that define welfare regimes also reflect and create cultures that may encourage, tolerate, or discourage births or women's paid employment after childbirth. We categorize welfare regimes according to a modified Esping-Andersen typology (Mills and Blossfeld Forthcoming-b).

3.3.1. Liberal

Liberal welfare regimes (Great Britain, Canada, and the United States) have a market-based approach to their policies. By creating favorable business climates, these regimes are designed to provide employment for their citizens mainly through the private sector. Compared to other welfare regimes, they have small public sectors and low levels of job security. High levels of employment flexibility and fewer regulations from unions and from government give firms opportunity to hire and fire workers as their demands require. Therefore, women in liberal welfare regimes find a variety of employment forms, from full time to marginal. The drawback is the employment benefits are weak, especially in part time and marginal work, and there is comparatively little job security.

For women working in liberal welfare regimes, barriers to employment include a lack of public child care and expensive private child care. Also, there is a tradition particularly in the U.S. of linking benefits like health insurance, paid time off, and pension contributions to full time jobs only. Part time jobs usually do not come with paid sick time or vacation time. Many occupations in female-dominated industries are only available in part time work, or they have low pay, or both. This means that women who have children have financial incentives to work full time, but practical incentives to rely on a well-paid earner with good job benefits. Men and women are treated equally by law in a way that seeks not to privilege women with exceptions like maternity leave but rather attempts to regard all workers in the same job status as equal, with equal responsibilities and benefits, regardless of need. As these welfare regimes experience globalization, jobs become more contingent, short-term, and insecure.

3.3.2. Conservative

In conservative welfare regimes (The Netherlands, Germany, and France), the male breadwinner assumption is the culturally primary family form. National policies in these regimes assume and encourage families to conform to a single (male) breadwinner template. Policies include long maternity leaves and tax structures that reward single-earner families and part time work for women by heavily taxing a second full income into a household. These countries are experiencing a slow shift from an extreme breadwinner model to a complementarity model with women as additional earners. Therefore, conservative countries like Germany are ripe for the kinds of jobs generated by globalization because a potential workforce is ready to move into flexible part time contingent employment based on their structural position as secondary earners in a system that supports the employment and high pay of the primary earner. More flexible work for women fits well with the logic of the male breadwinner model. We expect a big difference between men and women's life courses in conservative welfare regimes, with women experiencing enormous change, especially increases in marginal part-time work over time. We find young women more likely than men to be in fixed term contract jobs (see Volume 1). The situation is likely to be different for self-employed workers compared to employees.

3.3.3. Social democratic

Social democratic welfare regimes (Sweden, Denmark, and Norway) are characterized by a strong welfare state, a high proportion of women in public sector, and abundant reduced-full-time work. These regimes individualize and decommodify men and women, making them more equal in eyes of the state and legal system. Men and women in these regimes theoretically should be exposed equally to globalization, but in reality, these regimes still have high gender segregation, with men and women employed in different industries. However, women often work in service industries that are also the growth industries for globalization, and so women in social democratic countries may experience an expansion of employment opportunities.

Being unemployed is not as grave an issue for long-term job security in social democratic countries compared to liberal and conservative welfare regimes because in these regimes, it is easier to move in and out of employment due to an active labor force policy that includes additional training and re-skilling for the unemployed. Citizens enjoy lots of labor market flexibility due to a state-cushioned flexible labor market. Flexibility is thus supported by the state by the way the state supports the individual. Globalization may, however, put pressure on the welfare state to reduce costs in a competitive environment, ultimately giving citizens less security, if the state chooses to cut back in family policy areas. One piece of early evidence of globalization's effects on workers in social democratic countries is that cutbacks in the public sector jeopardize firm tenure. But the biggest risk population is workers with blue collar vocational training who are the most likely to be unemployed.

Within social democratic regimes, we anticipate few or no large fluctuations in job mobility changes across cohorts. These countries already experience high levels of mobility, so there is not much further that levels can increase.

3.3.4. Familistic

Familistic welfare regime (Italy, Spain, Mexico) have tended to rely on families and kinship networks instead of the state to take care of the sorts of supports offered by more generous welfare regimes. For example, familistic regimes offer less unemployment insurance, old-age pensions, or public child care than other regime types. Rather, they have among the longest paid maternity leave, which has the opposite effect of what would be expected: rather than

acting to reserve a woman's job for her for after the birth, an extremely long maternity leave sends the message to women that they belong at home to care for children rather than in the labor force after a birth. The consequences for women's labor force participation are severalfold. For one, women face few options for combining paid work and motherhood. Childcare is difficult to find, part time work is unavailable, and social policies discourage mothers' employment. Many young women are choosing to postpone or forego having children: Italy's birth rate, for example, is the lowest in the world.

3.3.5. Post-Socialist

Post-socialist countries (Estonia, Czech Republic, and Hungary) have a short but recent history of encouraging two-earner families. Full time employment for women has been the norm for the past 40 years due to the socialist practice of setting salaries at levels that required two salaries for each family and enacting legislation that required men and women to be in the labor market.

This full employment is no longer guaranteed by the state. More insecure employment has replaced life-long jobs, and unemployment is a growing trend. However, some strict employment protections remain, making these countries less liberalized than Western Europe, although more liberalized than they used to be. The service sector has grown in the process of modernization that ensued following the collapse of communism. In addition, social and economic inequalities have expanded.

Now that women are not required by law to be employed, some will leave the labor force because they have the option. Women in some of the post-socialist countries with a strong conservative tradition (such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland) seek part time work, but there are not many part time jobs, which forces women to choose between working full time or not to be employed. Two explanations exist for the lack of part time jobs. The public sector, a large employment sector, has no policy to give part time employment to women. The private sector, as in other countries, avoids creating part time jobs employers perceive that part time jobs are expensive to firms because the equal security given to part time jobs as to full time jobs comes without the same amount of time invested per worker.

Due to economic upheaval and the transition to a market economy in these welfare regimes, being out of the labor force is a situation many women can't afford, increasing the probability that women will work full time. Post-socialist welfare regimes do provide long maternity leaves (three years in some countries) and well-protected jobs in some sectors, but the sectors operate differently. Public service sectors are secure but low-paid. Among families with stable breadwinners, such employment may be a desirable option for women. Some state-owned factories remain, and these tend to be low-paid and insecure. The private sector operates using short-term contracts, but it also pays more.

Public child care services have collapsed in varying degrees in post-socialist countries, with some public child care remaining, although nurseries for very young children have been slowly disappearing since the Iron Curtain fell. In countries where there is little public child care, mothers have a harder time combining employment and family responsibilities.

3.3a Summary: Welfare Regimes and Globalization

To which extent do globalizing market forces change the policies of welfare regimes? How do such changes affect women's employment? We expect that if globalization reduces the amount of security granted by the welfare state, women are more likely to enter and stay in the labor force, and, depending on the availability of affordable child care, possibly reduce the number of children they planned to have.

In sum, women may be affected via the welfare state in three ways by globalization: a) globalization may alter regimes' child caring policies and needs, b) if jobs are cut from the economy, families can expect more layoffs and insecure employment, c) if the welfare regime is under economic duress, unemployment benefits are shortened.

3.4. Women in the Family System

Within the family system, one of the key questions is, what do women want? To work for pay? To raise children? Or both? Both, but not simultaneously? Women, traditionally the caretakers of families, have a more ambivalent relationship to the labor force than men do. They are also an extremely heterogeneous group, more so than men, because their life courses are subject not only more strongly than men to biology but also, through structural and historic/cultural mechanisms, to men's lives. The context of women in partnerships with men has the biggest influence on why and how women work for pay. One of the first predictors of whether a woman will be employed is the answer to the question of whether employment is mandatory or optional, and, if optional, if desired (Hakim 2002).

Women's labor force participation also is influenced by predominant national family structures, with women in countries with more traditional family systems requiring more impetus to enter the labor force than women in more egalitarian family systems. One explanation for family culture differences between nations is that welfare regimes produce certain kinds of families (though certain kinds of families and cultural backgrounds also produce certain kinds of welfare regimes) (Esping-Andersen 1999). In countries with traditional family systems, the "welfare safety net" for women has been husbands' earnings. As globalization erodes the security of the male breadwinner in some places (see Volume 2), what are the consequences for women? Women want secure jobs to compensate so that the entire well-being of the family is not dependent upon only one tenuous salary. By contrast, in two-earner families where there is a degree of security from another earner, wives may take more flexible jobs. Does globalization ultimately make women less likely to be flexible workers because they become essential earners, not complementary earners?

Women must earn money in the paid labor force under several circumstances: if their families are poor, if they are the sole earners for their families or themselves, if they are uncertain of having another source of income at the present time or in the future (as in the case of a married woman who suspects that a divorce may be imminent or that her husband may lose his job), and if the welfare state does not provide a livable alternative income source in these circumstances. Thus we see high levels of employment worldwide among women in lower socioeconomic classes, women who are not married, women who have husbands without reliable income, or women in welfare regimes that are not generous with benefits. Insofar as globalization may be reducing men's employment certainty, especially for younger men who are not yet firmly established in the labor market (see Volume 1) or for men in liberal welfare regimes (see Volume 2), we can expect that more women may be attached to the labor force directly through their own employment.

Outside of the need for women's employment, here are many explanations for women's increasing *voluntary* labor force attachment. Several have to do with macro-level historical changes: the expansion of education, longer life spans, and smaller family sizes (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2002). When a woman has more education, then she is likely to want to apply that knowledge in some productive capacity. When a woman knows she is likely to live 80 years or more, she can reasonably expect that caregiving responsibilities are not going to take up her entire adulthood. Therefore, she will seek other avenues for investing her energy and abilities in adulthood, and one of those ways is through employment (Moen 1992). The reduction in family size is related to women's labor force participation because women who are employed have less time for caregiving and so they often have fewer children. But also

women who have fewer children are more likely to invest in employment. The decline in the number of children could be a consequence (or a cause) of socio-cultural and economic trends such as the cult of intensive mothering (Hays 1996) that discourage large families.

Women often do not decide alone in their labor force participation decisions. Families can be seen as adaptive units (Moen and Wethington 1992) who seek to maximize benefit to the household. According to Becker (1981), there is economic rationality that drives the division of household labor: the worker who is earning the most should be “specializing” in the work domain, with the other worker specializing in the home domain. Gender differences in human capital investments and acquisition and in the levels of responsibility for household tasks and child care are all linked to husbands and wives’ roles. Spouses act in tandem, if not always in cooperation, because husbands and wives fill roles in relation to each other (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001). Because of strong cultural patterns of such a division along gender lines, sometimes couples either design their work and home investments so that the “work specializer” is the husband, or they continually make decisions to favor one worker’s job (the husband’s) over the other’s to where the rational action in the end is to favor the specializer’s (husband’s) job. Sometimes women assume such a subordination and thus start out in the education system investing their energy into employment paths that are bound to be secondary, and not primary, in a household. These patterns, when aggregated, produce a picture worldwide of women’s jobs earning less, being less stable, and having lower advancement possibilities than men’s jobs.

Often wives’ work is secondary in the household because of the earnings differences between men and women. But sometimes the reason for women’s lowered employment status in the family is cultural, even when earnings are the same. For example, in a study by Bielby and Bielby (data collected in 1977) on individuals in dual-earner couples, even between men and women of equal job investments, earnings, occupational status, and family circumstances, women are far less likely than men to say they would maximize their job prospects by, for example, relocating their families (Bielby and Bielby 1992).

Couples “do gender” through the ways in which they choose to divide work, avoid work, and create work from among their available options (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton 1985; Brines 1994; Hochschild 1989; West and Fenstermaker 1993; West and Fenstermaker 1995). For example, whether wives quit work after a residential move is partly determined by gender ideology, with traditional, family-centered women more likely to quit working, but career-centered women more likely to just commute longer distances after a move (Camstra 1996). The probability of quitting a job increases for women with more traditional family styles, but decreases for men with more traditional family styles. These behaviors reflect the attitudes of the actors.

Attitudes, though, are shaped by culture and do not emerge in a vacuum. The cultural logic of the family as a warm and nurturing institution is at odds with the cultural logic of the workplace, which is to apply maximum personal effort for maximum market gain. Where these two meet and create conflict, often change results. The degree of social change within and between cultures varies.

Sometimes the family system culture is out of step with the needs of the family, as is the case in families where wives’ employment is necessary but not culturally preferred and even looked upon with strong disfavor. This situation causes a clash between the family reality and the family ideal. So far, in the conflict between women’s work and family demands, institutionalized ideal solutions that “work” have yet to be found. In the meantime, individuals struggle between old expectations and new normless behaviors that may or may not be effective. As women change faster than men in their expectations and roles at home and work, the distribution of home labor in couples becomes lopsided, with women often

working a "second shift" of home carework in addition to a full-time job. These additional responsibilities can hamper women's ability to compete effectively in the labor market against those who do not have such responsibilities. When the overwhelming cultural messages are against women's paid employment, employed women are likely to experience a lack of institutional and community support. The degree of stress associated with employment may vary by life stage, with mothers of younger children feeling greater stress than women without children or with grown children.

The amount of stress associated with a given job status is likely to influence a woman's probability of staying in that job status, inducing a woman to stop employment or to take on part time instead of full-time work. Depending on the strength of the cultural prescriptions toward traditional gender roles, this disincentive for female labor force participation may have different effects on women's employment in different cultures.

As globalization forces alter institutions, will dominant cultural norms shift toward women's labor market participation and generate attitudinal and institutional support growing within the other relevant institutions, or will culture bifurcate into extremes that reflect the access of different groups toward power and privilege?

4. INDIVIDUAL OR MICRO-LEVEL RESPONSES TO GLOBALIZATION FORCES

Macro forces are invisible until they have an effect on individuals' behavior. In the expression of individuals' behavior, aggregated over society, we see the macro-level consequences of these forces. It is only when the macro forces produce choices that are interpreted and reacted to by individuals that they gain their strength and effect. Individuals believe they have choices and that they act in the world in the interests of their family. Often they do not see the constraints within which they are making their decisions. This is especially true in the ways institutions act on individuals. Without getting outside the institutions, literally or in the imagination, actors cannot see how their own behavior is constrained and influenced by these institutions.

Nonetheless, individuals can be quite clever in adapting to institutional constraints in order to get what they want. One example is the way women in Familistic regimes who want or need employment are adapting to the strong institutional pressures by simply reducing or eliminating their family responsibilities. Yet, this example illustrates the way women reconcile family and work by adjusting their own behavior and not the behavior of the institutions, either through reducing family or reducing work (withdrawing from the labor market).

Women's approach to work and family roles may have some inertia over the life course. For women with early life stage investments in careers, career investment is likely to pay higher and higher dividends over the life course, and so women are likely not only to retain their priority on their careers but also to make decisions that continually reinforce that priority. By contrast, women who have lower commitment to their jobs at an early life stage have less to gain by investing later in life. On the other hand, some women try to stagger their work and family commitments as a strategy, and so they invest first in one sphere (whether it be family or employment) and then later switch. For some women, opportunities are available at later ages that were not available at earlier ages, and this facilitates some of the movement between employment and non-employment for some women over time. Evidence indicates that women who take time off early in their careers for family responsibilities never regain the level of pay they would have obtained if they had not left the labor force (Jacobsen and Levin 1995).

4.1. Theoretical Framework

The theoretical strands predicting and explaining women's labor force participation and family lives strain under the heterogeneity of women's lives over time. These theoretical explanations are made all the more complex by the international context under which we are working. Our research draws together diverse theories from multiple sources and contributes empirical evidence in order to understand more clearly the causal mechanisms that are the architects of women's lives. We borrow from structuration theory (Giddens 1984) in acknowledging the links between micro and macro phenomena and the interdependence of agency and structure. Our view is of women's lives over time unfolding in dynamic interaction within unique structural and cultural contexts. A set of hypotheses allow us to investigate these relationships.

4.1.1. Employment Relation Hypothesis

Women are affected more by globalization uncertainties when they must re-enter the labor market than if they maintain continuous employment. In the labor market re-entry process, these women are outsiders and thus may experience discrimination for having outdated skills and fewer networks.

4.1.2. Human Capital Hypothesis

The globalizing economy favors highly-skilled workers, and those without more educational qualifications may be more likely to experience unemployment spells and reduced upward job mobility chances. Thus women lacking human (educational) capital will feel a greater impact of globalization than women with more human capital.

4.1.3. Education System Hypothesis

Women in countries with tighter education-to-job matches and opportunities for learning new labor market skills will have an easier experience reentering the labor market (faster re-employment) than women in regimes without such training programs.

4.1.4. Welfare Regime Hypothesis

Women's experiences in the labor market will vary by the welfare regime in which they reside. Women in post-socialist countries are likely to be buffered from unemployment and underemployment by the strong tradition of managed and regulated labor markets. Women in liberal welfare regimes will experience the opposite: rising insecurity and instability in the labor market due to a shrinking safety net, "business-friendly" governmental policies that pass insecurity and risk onto workers. Women in social democratic regimes, like those in post-socialist regimes, will be buffered from the effects of globalization by strong governmental supportive policies. Women in conservative welfare regimes will experience an increase in available part-time work which, with the tradition of job security and stability, will be advantageous to their employment possibilities. Finally, women in Familistic welfare regimes will experience globalization bringing their work experience into parity with men's by reducing men's security.

4.1.5. Alternative Role Hypothesis

Women whose income is not required for family survival, who have an alternative role as unpaid caregiver in the household, or who have support from generous maternity leaves will be buffered from the effects of globalization on employment. By contrast, in situations where male earnings and job security are declining, women will increase their attachment to the labor market and be more subject to global uncertainty.

4.1.6. Gender Inequality Hypothesis

As globalization creates a broader, market-based "outsider" labor market, and as women have traditionally been part of that market, globalization may increase gender inequality by limiting women's opportunities to enter the insider market. On the other hand, the expansion of an outsider market means that more men will find themselves in the outsider labor market, which may reduce gender inequality by expanding the inequalities among different occupational classes of men.

4.1.7. Life Course Interruption Hypothesis

Women who interrupt their employment careers to manage their family or caregiving careers are more vulnerable to the uncertainties in the labor market created by globalization because their absence leads to a loss of network ties, wages, and experience.

5. DATA AND METHODS

6. SUMMARY OF THE BOOK

Women's labor force participation and the processes of globalization are complex and interwoven phenomena. This volume will examine these two in tandem and seek answers.

To summarize, we are asking:

Do women experience more mobility, flux, or fluidity in their labor market attachments and types of jobs over time? Are the types of labor market attachments (part-time, full-time, marginal, or not employed) changing? What are the (new) meanings of these kinds of labor market attachments?

In what direction is the mobility of women mostly moving: upward, downward, interfirm? What is the role of interruptions in predicting the direction of women's labor market mobility? What impact are women's transitions to and from labor market interruptions (for education or family caregiving responsibilities) having on their long-term job mobility?

Women have, in the past, had more unstable employment life courses with more interruptions than men because of their role as primary caregivers in their families. Does globalization produce new occupational instability for women, as the globalizing market, new technologies, and global competition disrupt what had been becoming relatively stable female life course employment paths?

By contrast, are women disproportionately entering the kinds of jobs that globalization forces are creating? More specifically, does the growth in flexible employment and short-term contracts enabling women to establish careers alongside their family responsibilities where they once would have had to choose between the two?

Does the growing insecurity of male labor force participation and the erosion of the welfare state in some parts of the world mean that women's labor force attachments are becoming stronger to compensate, in effect making women's life courses more like men's?

How are these processes of women's increasing or decreasing attachment to the labor force filtered by institutions (such as welfare regimes, education systems, employment regimes, and family systems) and cultural traditions?

In which occupational classes, industrial sectors, and educational levels are women "winning": better able to find employment or advance their careers under globalization? Some sectors and classes may provide women with rapid re-employment after job interruptions, opportunities for upward mobility, or access to better employment options.

In which occupational classes, industrial sectors, and educational levels are women “losing”: less able to advance their employment, or more likely to become unemployed, due to globalization? Some sectors and classes that employ a disproportionately large share of women may be shrinking or moving to other countries where labor is cheaper. In which sectors is job advancement or reemployment after a job interruption more difficult?

At the end of this volume, we will work out answers to broader, cross-national comparative questions of globalization, including evaluating the evidence that labor market systems are converging or diverging in these aspects of women’s life courses.

REFERENCES

- Aschaffenburg, K. E. 1995. "Rethinking Images of the Mobility Regime: Making a Case for Women's Mobility." *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 14:201-235.
- Auer, P. and S. Cazes. 2000. "The Resilience of the Long-Term Employment Relationship: Evidence from the Industrialized Countries." *International Labour Review* 139:379-408.
- Beck, U. 1992. *Risk Society*. London: Sage.
- . 1997/2000. *What is Globalization?* Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Beck, Ulrich. 2000. "What is Globalization?" Pp. 99-104 in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, edited by D. Held and A. McGrew. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. 1985. *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Bielby, W. T. and James N. Baron. 1986. "Men and Women at Work: Sex Segregation and Statistical Discrimination." *American Journal of Sociology* 91:759-799.
- Bielby, William T. and Denise D. Bielby. 1992. "I Will Follow Him: Family Ties, Gender Role Beliefs, and Reluctance to Relocate for a Better Job." *American Journal of Sociology* 97:1241-67.
- Blossfeld, Hans-Peter and Sonja Drobnic. 2001. "Careers of Couples in Contemporary Societies: From Male Breadwinner to Dual Earner Families." Pp. 396. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2002. *Couples in Contemporary Society*.
- Brines, Julie. 1994. "Economic Dependency, Gender, and the Division of Labor at Home." *American Journal of Sociology* 100:652-688.
- Camstra, Ronald. 1996. "Commuting and Gender in a Lifestyle Perspective." *Urban Studies* 33:283-300.
- Coser, Rose Laub. 1991. "Women's Cultural Mandate." Pp. 113-135 in *In Defense of Modernity: Role Complexity and Individual Autonomy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1993. "Post-industrial class structures: An analytical framework." Pp. 7-31 in *Changing Classes*, edited by G. Esping-Andersen. London: Sage.
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1999. *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gera, S. and P. Massé. 1996. "Employment Performance in the Knowledge-Based Economy." in *Industry Canada Working Paper*. Ottawa, Canada.
- Giddens, A. 1973. *The Class Structure of Advanced Societies*. New York: Harper Torchbooks.
- . 2000. *Runaway World: How Globalization is Reshaping Our Lives*. London: Profile Books.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1984. *The Constitution of Society : Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Grusky, David B. 2001. "Social Stratification: Class, Race, & Gender in Sociological Perspective." Pp. 911, edited by D. B. Grusky. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Hakim, Catherine. 2002. "Lifestyle Preferences as Determinants of Women's Differentiated Labor Market Careers." *Work and Occupations* 29:428-459.
- Hays, Sharon. 1996. *The Cultural Contradictions of Motherhood*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Hochschild, Arlie. 1989. *The Second Shift*. New York: Avon.
- Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 1983. *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Huff, Anne S. 1991. "Wives -- Of The Organization." Pp. 1-32. Boulder, Colorado.
- Jacobsen, Joyce P. and Laurence M. Levin. 1995. "Effects of intermittent labor force attachment on women's earnings." *Monthly Labor Review*:14-19.
- Mayer, K.-U. 2001. "The Paradox of Global Social Change and National Path Dependencies: Life Course Patterns in Advanced Societies." Pp. 89-110 in *Inclusions and Exclusions in European Societies*, edited by A. Woodward and M. Kohli. New York: Routledge.
- Mills, Melinda. 2004. "Demand for Flexibility or Generation of Insecurity? The Individualization of Risk, Irregular Work Shifts and Canadian Youth." *Journal of Youth Studies* 7.
- Mills, Melinda and Hans-Peter Blossfeld. Forthcoming-a. "The Resilience of Men's Labor Market Mobility: A Theoretical Framework." in *Globalization, Uncertainty, and Men in Society*, edited by H. P. Blossfeld, M. Mills, and F. Bernardi. Under Review.
- Mills, Melinda and Hans-Peter Blossfeld. Forthcoming-b. "Globalization, Uncertainty and the Early Life Course: A Theoretical Framework." in *Globalization, Uncertainty, and Youth in Society*, edited by H. P. Blossfeld, E. Klijzing, M. Mills, and Karin Kurz. London: Routledge.
- Mills, Melinda, Hans-Peter Blossfeld, and Erik Klijzing. Forthcoming. "Becoming an Adult in Uncertain Times: A 14-Country Comparison of the Losers of Globalization." in *Globalization, Uncertainty, and Youth in Society*, edited by H.-P. Blossfeld, E. Klijzing, M. Mills, and Karin Kurz. London: Routledge.
- Moen, Phyllis. 1992. *Women's Two Roles: A Contemporary Dilemma*. New York: Auburn House.
- . 1994. "Women, Work, and Family: A Sociological Perspective on Changing Roles." Pp. 151-170 in *Age and Structural Lag: Society's Failure to Provide Meaningful Opportunities in Work, Family, and Leisure*, edited by M. W. Riley, R. L. Kahn, and A. Foner. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
- Moen, Phyllis and Elaine Wethington. 1992. "The Concept of Family Adaptive Strategies." *Annual Review of Sociology* 18:233-251.
- Parsons, Talcott. 1953. "A Revised Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification." Pp. 386-439 in *Essays in Sociological Theory*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
- Reich, Robert B. 1991. *The Work of Nations*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Riegraf, Birgit. 1996. *Geschlecht und Mikropolitik*, vol. 5, Edited by I. Lenz, M. Mae, S. Metz-Göckel, U. Müller, and M. Stein-Hilbers. Opladen: Leske+Budrich.
- Rosenfeld, R. A. 1990. "Race and Sex Differences in Career Dynamics." *American Sociological Review* 45:583-609.
- . 1992. "Job Mobility and Career Processes." *Annual Review of Sociology* 18:39-61.
- Rudolph, Hedwig and Marlies Grüning. 1993. "Neue Jobs für neue Frauen? Frauenförderung und die Dynamik gespaltener Arbeitsmärkte." in *Innovation und Beharrung in der Arbeitsmarktpolitik*, edited by B. Strümpel and M. Dierkes. Stuttgart: Schäffer-Poeschel Verlag für Wirtschaft, Steuern, Recht GmbH & Co. KG.
- Spitze, Glenna. 1988. "Women's Employment and Family Relations: A Review." *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 50:595-618.
- Standing, G. 1989. "Global Feminization through Flexible Labor." *World Development* 17:1077-1095.
- Stiglitz, J. E. 2002. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. London: W. W. Norton and Company.
- West, Candace and Sarah Fenstermaker. 1993. "Power, Inequality, and the Accomplishment of Gender: An Ethnomethodological View." Pp. 151-174 in *Theory on Gender/Feminism on Theory*, edited by P. England. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- . 1995. "Doing Difference." *Gender and Society* 9:8-37.