

Women's employment in the United States

Heather Hofmeister

A modified version of this paper will appear in:
Hans-Peter Blossfeld and Heather Hofmeister (Eds.)
Globalization, Uncertainty, and Women in Society
(Forthcoming)

<http://www.uni-bamberg.de/sowi/soziologie-i/globalife>

**Faculty of Social and Economic Science
Department of Sociology I
Otto-Friedrich University of Bamberg
Lichtenhaidestr. 11
P.O. Box 1549
D-96045 Bamberg
Germany**

Women's employment in the United States

Heather Hofmeister

INTRODUCTION

This paper will assess the possible impacts of globalization forces, in terms of rising uncertainty, on the careers of women born in the United States between 1942 and 1953 based on their exits, re-entrances, and job mobility in the 1970s and 1980s, comparing the earliest born with the latest born.

The United States is the most populous country described in this volume (with 141 million women) representing an enormous scope and complexity of women's experiences. With its individualist-orientation and labor market/family policies that vary in each of the 50 states, the pathways women take to and through employment over the life course can bear many variations, but despite this diversity, some patterns are found throughout the country. Labor market pathways in the United States are uncertain in comparison to many other countries in this volume, where labor protections are stronger and seniority, state intervention, and large public sectors protect many jobs. But women tend to experience more uncertainty than men, even within a particular country, and the United States is no exception. American women, like women in other countries, are concentrated in radically unequal fields of study and institutions (Charles & Bradley, 2002) and they still average less pay and security than men in the labor market even for the same jobs.

Much evidence shows that American women began a rapid rise in employment in the 20th century due to a variety of factors, including delayed age at marriage, more education, postponement of first births, declining birth rates, and rising divorce rates, as well as the decline in the earnings of male breadwinners (Fuchs, 1988). The idea that the macro process behind all of these factors could be globalization will be evaluated here (H.-P. Blossfeld, Klijzing, Mills, & Kurz, 2005). If it is true that globalization is the driving force behind all the phenomena listed here, we should see more women employed across cohorts, and staying in employment longer, regardless of personal characteristics or structural locations, including marriage and motherhood. If globalization is a force that unseats women from their relatively secure employment, we should see more downward mobility for the youngest cohort, particularly for the highly qualified. Globalization forces are filtered through institutions, so it is possible

that more uncertainty is felt by women in some structural locations (such as low education status) than in others. Whether uncertainty is rising across cohorts in the case of the United States will be indicated through rising levels of downward mobility, more specific allocation of upward mobility only to those women with higher educational qualifications, reduced exits from employment due to family formation, and earlier re-entries to employment after children have grown.

I compare three cohorts of women in the United States, one born between 1942 and 1945, one between 1946 and 1949, and the last born between 1950 and 1953 to examine changes in their respective levels of labor market mobility and work careers during a time of rising uncertainty. I assume that women's career mobility and the likelihood of unemployment are filtered through institutions, including the labor market, education system, and the family. I link recent developments in the labor market and other institutions in the United States to the timing and experiences of my specific United States cohorts.

I find that what hinders women's career mobility are long job interruptions, low education, young children, and being African-American. What helps women's careers is higher education, which is increasingly important across cohorts, and living in South for the earlier cohort. Movement up and down the mobility ladder is reduced by long job tenure, full time work, and marriage. Across cohorts, part time work and dual jobs make more turmoil (increasing risks of upward and downward movement), and a higher number of jobs indicate a greater risk over time away from upward mobility and toward downward mobility.

GLOBALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Globalization is defined in this volume as the interaction of economic, technological, cultural and political changes, fueled by technological change, the dependence on worldwide market events, and the internationalization of markets and global competition (see Hofmeister, Mills, and Blossfeld 2003). For United States women's careers, some of these aspects apply more directly than others. Women are overrepresented in service-sector and knowledge-based jobs, which are strongly affected by the diffusion of knowledge and the spread of networks due to information and communication technologies. Telecommuting, boundary-less contract work, and information-based jobs have expanded the range of employment opportunities available and made the workplace and the workday more flexible, which contributes to a rise in United States women's employment as women who would otherwise not enter the labor market choose to participate in one of these new, technology-based ways (Marler, Tolbert, & Milkovich, 2003). Technological advances also encourage educational expansion by requiring more and different, often computer-related, skills (Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1993). In the American context, continuing education programs, especially those that teach computer skills, draw many women who have raised families and are interested in returning to the labor market.

Women's returns to the labor market are of crucial importance for many American families in particular for several reasons. The rising importance of markets and their susceptibility to random shocks happening throughout the world means that men's careers are less secure in recent decades than they were at the middle of the 20th century (Mills & DiPrete, 2005). This has consequences for the affordability of "housewifery" in American households based on the threat of cessation of cash flow (unemployment benefits last only 6 months in the United States, and not all jobs qualify), but the risks of an unstable breadwinner are even deeper. In the United States, health insurance and retirement pensions are primarily dependent on the employer or the fact of being employed. Health insurance is a benefit offered by employers or can be purchased if the potential insured are healthy enough, but at high prices. Private or company-provided pension savings form the bulk of old-age financial security due to minimal federal retirement payments (which in turn are based on lifetime earnings). These private retirement savings are either aided by matching funds from the employer or merely administrated by the employer through pre-tax retirement accounts. If there is only one earner in a household and he or she either loses his or her job or his or her employer does not offer health insurance or retirement security, the entire household suffers. Many American families reduce the uncertainties of health care and retirement security, as well as immediate living expenses, by having two employed adults. This means women are entering and staying in the labor market at high rates relative to other countries, in large part based on the financial uncertainties of the United States system (see also Blossfeld, Buchholz, and Hofaecker Forthcoming).

The sister chapters in this volume point to the intensification of competition due to deregulation and privatization forces as sources of women's employment changes over the last half of the 20th century. The story is different for American women than for women in Europe because of the longer history of deregulation and privatization in the United States market and the emphasis on individualism and free market forces that have long governed the economy (Lipset, 1995). Nonetheless, late 20th century firm-level efforts to improve "market share" and competitiveness, including send jobs offshore and opening the labor market via free trade agreements such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), likely also affected the employment of women, particularly in some industries.

The United States has a work climate where frequent job-changes are not uncommon, and even lower-earning workers move to find new jobs. Unemployment benefits are minimal compared with West European welfare states. Thus, willingness to move -- often far from kinship networks -- for work-related reasons is a characteristic of some parts of the American labor market. Divorce rates are also high in the United States and have remained so since the 1970s (Cherlin, 1989). Thus, many American women face the multiple insecurities of higher divorce probabilities, more job insecurities for male breadwinners, the possibility of living far from kin, and lower job security for themselves than women in other country contexts. These multiple insecurities mean that it is relatively more difficult for individuals to make assumptions

about the future in the United States, as benefits, investments, jobs, created kin networks, and geographic locations shift over time. Some (market-based) institutions may help alleviate these insecurities, for example, market-based childcare, a relatively open labor market, and chances for re-training and re-entry into employment at all stages of the life course. These institutions are discussed in more detail below.

Employment

The United States is categorized as a liberal welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1999) and has what is known as an "open economy," which means high levels of employment and job turnover, short-term contract labor, inequalities in wages, and intense competition for jobs. Such economies also tend to have low levels of unemployment, low minimum wages, and an abundance of low-wage, low-skill jobs. Labor market insecurity is relatively high due to lower levels of government and union job protection.

Women are still more likely than men to leave the labor market when children are born and raised. In the more open labor market of the United States with high turnover, the boundary between labor market insiders and outsiders is less distinct than in other systems, and therefore re-entry can be easier. It is, nonetheless, not easy even in the United States for women to return to jobs at the level they left, and the "mommy penalty" in wages and retirement savings for leaving the labor market is high (Avellar & Smock, 2003).

The open economy also creates many part time jobs, which some workers piece together to create a full-time work schedule. The problem with part-time work, particularly when full-time work is needed, is not only that the pay is lower, but also that those crucial employer-provided benefits are not usually available for part-time jobs. The open economy also provides for re-skilling throughout life course, a point I take up in the next section.

The consequences for women of working in an open economy are several. While high turnover in the labor market may open opportunities for women to re-enter after childrearing on the one hand, it can disadvantage women who already have full-time upwardly mobile employment. Work interruptions still have high economic costs for women (Stier & Lewin-Epstein, 2001). However, one difference to many European countries is that infant and child care is available in the free market, enabling employed mothers with financial means to compete with non-caregiving men more easily than elsewhere (Stier & Lewin-Epstein, 2001). Poorer mothers rely on informal arrangements of kin and neighborhood networks or taking work shifts opposite their husbands. High levels of short-term contract labor give women the flexibility some prefer in order to combine employment and caregiving. On the other hand, such contracts are not in the best interests of women who prefer or need long-term contracts and job security (Marler & Moen, 2002). Low wages mean long hours, multiple jobs, or multiple, perhaps intergenerational, earners for low-skilled women who must support families (Ehrenreich, 2001).

Education

The United States' education system expanded drastically in the 20th century. By 2000, 88 percent of women ages 18 to 24 had completed high school (against 85 percent of men) (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000). The secondary education system is flexible and deregulated, with content and quality varying widely by state, within states, by district, as well as by individual school, and typically does not train workers directly for jobs, so American workers are highly flexible for the type of job they can take. The post-secondary education system is large, with 63 percent of high school completers enrolling in 2000 (U.S. Department of Labor, 2002) and over 14 million people enrolled in colleges and universities in the year 2000 (U.S. Department of Education, 2001). It is also growing, with total enrollments rising nearly 14 percent between 1987 and 1992; among non-traditional aged students (aged 25 and older), the growth rate was 41 percent (Dortch, 1997). And since 1979, women have surpassed men in American college enrollments and graduation rates (1997). The colleges and universities compete with each other for students and therefore strive to offer relevant and flexible courses: new degree programs and fields of specialization spring up regularly. Non-traditional students make up a growing proportion of college enrollments: 43 percent in 1992-93, up to 46 percent in 1999-2000 (U.S. Department of Education, 2000). Twenty-two percent of undergraduates in the United States in 1992-93 had non-spouse dependents (usually children), and that figure rose to 27 percent by 1999-2000 (2000). Not all adult education is taking place in "traditional" colleges and universities, though. In 1991, fifty-eight million adult Americans enrolled in adult education programs, a figure that rose to 90 million, with 23 percent of these participants taking work-related courses, not including post-secondary enrollment (Kim & Creighton, 1999). This evidence suggests that the United States is a nation where training, and re-training, are available-and used – throughout the life course, not just fitting into a narrow life stage window before employment. Education often takes place concurrently; nearly 40 percent of undergraduates in the 1999-2000 school year also worked full-time, and an additional 48 percent work part time (U.S. Department of Education, 2000). The ties between education and labor market have never been stronger, also for women (H. P. Blossfeld & Huinink, 1991; Cohen & Bianchi, 1999; Herring & Wilsonsadberry, 1993; Jacobsen & Levin, 1995; Leibowitz & Klerman, 1995; Yoon & Waite, 1994).

Welfare state

The United States orients protection against social risks via the market, through both the availability of risk protection purchased privately (various kinds of insurance) and "job benefits" offered as partial compensation for certain kinds of full-time employment in larger firms (health insurance, retirement savings). These programs were organized starting in the 1950s, increased through the 1970s via federal tax incentives encouraging firms to provide such protection, and have declined considerably since then. At a time when most women did not have full-time work through large firms, these protections were available to

women and families typically through the breadwinner's career. These protections are dwindling and were never mandated for part-time work or employment in small firms.

In the 1970s and 1980s, women's careers were influenced by the 1963 Equal Pay Act, which reduced but did not eliminate pay differentials between men and women doing the same jobs. And in 1987, the first family leave legislation was passed in four states, paving the way for the first federal protection against job loss for caregiving, enacted in the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act (though protected leave is unpaid and limited to 12 weeks per 12 months). In 1988, in an effort to assist low-income single mothers, the Family Support Act provided federally funded job training and job-finding assistance, coupled with childcare, transportation, and health care benefits. The minimum wage was finally increased in 1990 from \$3.35 to \$3.80 per hour as well (U.S. Department of Labor, 2004). In the 1980s and 1990s, under Republican and Democratic administrations, the federal programs designed to protect women and children from extreme poverty, which originated in the 1930s welfare programs and the 1960s "Great Society" programs, were cut back in favor of programs to encourage full employment and individual self-sufficiency. The welfare programs that do exist are organized within guidelines set by the federal government but are administered by states, national generalizations about use, qualifying criteria, durations of use, and levels of poverty difficult, to say nothing of the difficulty of comparing the United States welfare state to those of other countries in this volume.

In sum, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States government has introduced a number of policy reforms which foster the trend towards increasing the labor market participation of mothers by institutionalizing the idea of an 'adult worker model,' therefore penalizing those who have difficulties combining paid work and care work, such as single parents (Guthrie & Roth, 1999; Woods, 2004).

Family structure

As in other countries, families in the United States have also undergone transformation since the early 1970s, with high divorce rates (Coontz, 1992; Stacey, 1991). In the face of limited or non-existent welfare benefits for single mothers in the United States, many American women can expect to be the sole income provider for themselves and their children for at least some of their adult lives, a life stage not associated with affluence (Hirschl, Altobelli, & Rank, 2003). And unlike in some European contexts where the birthrate has plummeted in recent decades to rates well-below replacement levels (under 2.1 children per woman), women in the United States have not significantly reduced their rate of childbirth.

HYPOTHESES

Globalization's Effects on Women in the United States

We argue in this volume and series that globalization is felt by individuals through the rise in insecurity and uncertainty in their specific circumstances. So I expect that women will experience such rising insecurity directly through their labor market participation and indirectly through their connection to would-be male breadwinners. I therefore have two sets of hypotheses:

- 1 Increasing uncertainty in employment:
Increasing uncertainty in employment is defined as more downward job moves, more exits, and longer durations before re-entering the market. I may find this. But as men, especially in some industries, are experiencing more turbulent careers, women may be hired to replace them, at lower wages and with better chances for promotion, given their overrepresentation at the bottom rungs of the occupational hierarchy.
- 2 Differential distribution of uncertainty:
As uncertainty rises, the insecurities in the labor market will be differentially distributed between labor market insiders (those who have more experience, full time work, and longer job tenure) and outsiders (newcomers to the labor market, part-time workers, those with long gaps between jobs), thus expanding inequalities. Women who exit may have a harder time reentering over time. I expect more upward mobility for women who remain in employment and with an employer longer. Downward mobility should be greater for women if they have shorter tenure in their jobs, more and longer job interruptions, lower job prestige, lower levels of education, have a higher number of previous jobs,¹ and fewer work hours. Women with lower levels of education and skill will be more vulnerable to shifts and fluctuations in employment rates and wages. These women are likely to remain at low-income levels with less marital security and less job security or job availability than highly educated women.
- 3 Family Circumstances:
I expect that across cohorts, married women will have fewer moves out of the labor market and faster returns to employment than earlier cohorts; essentially, marriage will make less difference to women's employment exits as most men's real incomes are declining. This pattern should go against a within-cohort pattern for the earliest-born cohort that married women are more likely to exit the labor market and less likely to re-enter given the presence of another earner because they can be more selective about employment opportunities. The effect will be most acute for women with lower levels of education, who, due to marital homogamy, are likely to be married to a man with also lower levels of education, the group most affected by declining wages and job opportunities.

Within cohorts, women with more children should have more moves out of the labor market, presumably for caregiving responsibilities, especially for younger

children. But under conditions of rising uncertainty, I expect that *across* cohorts, due to the rising insecurity of the male breadwinner, women with more children will become less likely to exit employment over time, due to financial necessity. Living in the southern United States and racial background are likely to be important moderators of these relationships. The southern United States had an economic boom in the 1970s while the North experienced oil price shocks. African American women have a longer history of labor market involvement than other women, but with many more labor market disadvantages compared to caucasian American women. The complexities of how race is lived in America go beyond the scope of this paper in its context in this comparative volume (Lelyveld 2001), so its use here is limited to a control indicator. Proper investigation of career transitions of black versus caucasian and Hispanic women in the United States would require more elaborate analyses.

DATA AND METHODS

I use a panel study called the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Young Women,² a nationally representative, semi-annual panel study of the civilian, non-institutionalized female population of women ages 14 to 22 living in the United States in 1968. There have been 19 annual and biennial interviews between 1968 and 1999, and the young women born 1942-53 (e.g., containing the three cohorts of interest here) were surveyed nationwide. The entire sample size in 1968 was 5,159, and by 1999, 2,900 respondents remained (a 56% retention rate). This study oversampled black women (at a rate twice their representation in the population) and includes extensive questions about education, labor force participation, fertility, and household composition.³

I divide the sample into three birth cohorts (1942-45, 1946-49, and 1950-53) who entered the labor market and developed their work and family careers under different conditions. Models of the center cohort are in the tables but will not be highlighted in the text in order to better contrast the two cohorts with more diverse experiences.⁴

Women in the earliest birth cohort, born 1942 to 1945, were born during World War II and thus precede the United States baby boom that began in 1946. For these young women entering their twenties in the early and mid-1960s, the feminist revolution was only beginning and probably did not affect their early career choices to nearly the same extent that later cohorts were affected. This cohort turned thirty by the early 1970s, in time for the oil price shocks and higher unemployment rates. If they entered employment after child-rearing, it would thus have been in the 1980s when the economy started to rebound.

The latest birth cohort, born 1950 to 1953, was born toward the peak years of the baby boom. These women participated in the women's movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s as teenagers, likely affecting their career options and outlook towards work. Their career-building and child-rearing years occurred during the energy crisis, as well as in an era when popular discourse centered on

the idea of the "Supermom" who could both have a successful full-time career and be equally successful in traditional roles ascribed to women.

The context of American women's employment is different from that of European countries, especially with regard to the meaning of unemployment and unpaid caregiving. To determine the difference between whether a woman is unemployed (seeking work but unable to find it) or out of the labor force (for any reason, including caregiving), one must ask the woman herself whether she considers herself to be looking for work. If she is, then the question is when the last time was that she looked for work.

Unemployment status is quite fluid in the United States, since a woman with alternate financial support (such as an employed husband) might become officially unemployed but then could abandon the job search to focus on unpaid caregiving instead. Conversely, a woman might begin a spell out of paid employment due to providing unpaid caregiving, and then begin to look for work months or years later. The demarcation points between these shifts are difficult if not impossible to pinpoint in retrospectively reported life history panel data, as the precise questions about when a woman ceased to or began looking for work are often not asked. The definitions of unemployment or unpaid caregiving are more subjective categories for American women than for women in countries where specific government benefits are assigned based on status. Furthermore, unemployment benefits in the United States are limited (26 weeks), contingent (on previous full-time employment, ongoing job search, or other restrictions) or nonexistent compared to European countries, especially for part-time workers. Therefore, some women's "unemployment" looks and acts exactly like other women's experience out of the labor force (OLF).

In light of these difficulties, I use two kinds of labor force possibilities, or technically "state spaces," among which women may move during their employment career: employed and not employed. The possibility to be not employed includes women who are unemployed, out of the labor force, or "not working (status not determined)."

Women could therefore have the following types of labor force transitions in these analyses:

- 1 movement into paid employment from non-employment lasting at least one month, using the portion of the sample not in a job who are therefore "at risk" of entry, or able to enter, which excludes women who are employed continuously throughout the observation window and includes women (N=571) who never report paid employment during this time (total N=4352).
- 2 movement out of paid employment for one month or longer using the portion of the sample who are in employment at any point in time, omitting those 571 women who never reported a job and including women who never had an interruption (but who are always "at risk"). Employed women work for pay either full time -- 35 or more hours per week total in all jobs (69% of job spells) -- or part time, defined as working 1-34 hours in one or more jobs or in their main job (25% of job spells). I also include a category to identify

the 6 percent of job spells for which weekly work hours are not available (total N=4413).

- 3 movement from one job to another, with or without a job interruption, measured in terms of upward, downward, or lateral job mobility, using the same sample of employed women as in transition type 2. Job changes are determined by a change in the occupational code or an interruption of longer than one month between jobs. Upward mobility is identified when the new job's occupational prestige measure (on a 100-point scale) is at least 10% higher than the job that was left. Downward mobility is indicated when the new job's occupational prestige measure is at least 10% less than the previous job (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996). Lateral mobility means movement to a job whose prestige is within the ten percent range. For example, a woman working in a job with an ISEI prestige value of 60 would have an *upwardly* mobile transition if her next job had a prestige value at or above 66; a *downward* move would be at or below a prestige score of 54. A lateral move would be a move to a job whose prestige code is between 55 and 65.

Explanatory variables

My only time-constant covariate is race, defined as "African-American" or "all others" due to constraints given by the racial categories available in the 1968 data (28% of the sample is African-American). In each job episode, I categorize job characteristics such as hours worked, the job prestige score, and whether the women also had a second job. My time-varying covariates include education, marital status, region, and number of children in the household (see Table 13.1).

During the data collection process, several pieces of time-varying information, such as the births or adoptions of children, the date education was completed, or the fact of having moved into or out of the Southern United States) were collected only at the interview following the event. Dates of the event were not collected (limited information exists for births that occurred in the mid-1970s). To approximate the dates at which these events took place and to standardize the errors, I made several assumptions. I adjust education to change at the most typical graduation month in the United States, May, from the year before the survey (surveys were given yearly during the most intensive education-building years for the women in the survey). I change the region of the country and the number of children in the household at the point halfway between the two interviews that report a change. This means a six to twelve-month window within which the birth or move took place, with a normal error -- approximately half the reports are assumed to be too early and half are assumed to be too late. These adjustments are not ideal, but without actual dates of moves and births it is the best possible way to vary these events over time.

All children's ages were calculated yearly, and at the point that the youngest child in the household changed category, this calculation was also made halfway between interviews.

(Table 13.1 about here)

Analyses

Mobility transitions are modeled with continuous time event history analysis, with time measured in months since the beginning of each episode – for job episodes, this means time since the start of the current job, measured whether the woman is in the current job for 12 or fewer months, 13 to 24 months, 25 to 36 months, or 37 or more months (true for 66% of the job episodes). When the current job is separated from the next job by an interruption in employment, as was the case in 67 percent of the job episodes, the time is also measured in increments of 0 to 6 months, 7 to 12 months, and 13 or more months (55% of interruptions). I treat non-interviews (due to attrition) and observations after the age of 41 as right-censored (beyond the window of analysis) so that my cohorts reach approximately the same ages during the analyses, from 22 to 41.

RESULTS

I begin by describing entries into and exits from paid employment, followed by a discussion of findings for upward and downward movement within the job career.

Transitions from non-employment to employment

In terms of movement from non-employment into the labor market, cohort 1942-45 is significantly different from both of the other cohorts (see Table 13.2).

Table 13.2 about here

For all cohorts, longer duration out of employment means a lower chance of returning. This makes sense from several perspectives. The women who are out of employment may lack skills for employment or have strong religious or cultural values against women's employment. From the perspective of employers, a job candidate who has had a long duration out of the market is assumed to have rusty skills or a lack of drive.

Education's effect on job entry is changing across cohorts. Women who lack even a high school degree are less likely to return to the market across all cohorts, but college educated women experience a decline in the value of their degrees for gaining re-entry for the later-born cohort. This might represent the effect of educational expansion, where a college degree ceases to be a special signal for women. The college degree might make a difference for the kind of job one qualifies for (as we will see in Table 13.4), but the effect on the chance of employment is not significantly different for women with a college degree compared to a high school degree. Or, this could reflect an effect of globalization, where even a college degree does not protect women or aid them in the labor market, as we see in the German case study (Buchholz & Grunow 2003).

Family factors have a powerful effect on women's entry to jobs. At this point in the analysis we see the confounding of effects that are likely related to moves out of unemployment versus moves out of unpaid caregiving (which are not modeled distinctly in these analyses). The effect of marriage on women's chances of entering jobs changes across cohorts, from having no effect to having a strong positive effect: married women are more likely to enter/re-enter than non-married women. The selection effect of "who is out of the market who can re-enter" is probably a strong component of this effect, that many of the women at risk of entry are married, those with another earner. But the fact that this effect manifests itself only in the latest cohort implies a globalization effect as well. Where once married women had the choice whether or not to be employed in the United States, because the financial support of the family came from a breadwinner husband, the later cohort experiences the financial need for all able-bodied adults in the household do to their part toward earning a living.

The effect of parenthood on women's returns to jobs follows another path. All mothers of small children in each cohort are more likely than women without children under age 18 to return to the labor market. This seems at first counterintuitive, but it actually makes sense. The United States, as a liberal welfare regime, lacks financial supports and legal requirements for mothers of young children to stay out of the labor market. Thus women do interrupt, contributing to the representation of mothers at risk of re-entry, but they return within the first year, definitely the first five years, of their youngest child's life. school-aged children, then, have no effect on their mother's employment because by and large, the mothers who will re-enter already have by the time their youngest is at least 6. The other counterintuitive result, that teenagers decrease the probability of re-entry for the latest cohort, is easily explained by the demographics of the later cohort: those women who have teenagers already before the time window of this study closes gave birth to those teenagers when they, themselves, were teenagers. The last year of data for this study is 1991, and this cohort was born from 1950 to 1953, meaning that for a woman to have a 17-year-old already in 1991 means that child was born in 1974 to a woman who was in her late teens or very early 20s.

The demographic controls special to the United States bear discussion. Women residing in the south in the latest cohort were experiencing the boom in the economy in the 1980s, and this could explain the significant result of southern residence on job entry. African-American women, on the other hand, experience consistently reduced chances to enter the labor market.

Transition from employment to non-employment

Cohort differences are significant only between the 46-49 cohort and the 50-53 cohort. Therefore the 42-45 cohort is not discussed in the analyses of employment to non-employment but can be viewed as an indicator of trends across cohorts (see Table 13.3).

(Table 13.3 about here)

Who moves out of jobs? Findings here confound unemployment and unpaid-caregiving exits, but the results nonetheless give indicators about under which circumstances women exit paid employment. Tenure and prestige matter to keep women in the labor market: duration in the current job decreases the odds of exit across cohorts, as does the total months spent in the labor force to date and a higher level of job prestige. For the later cohort, part-time work compared to full-time work acts as a stepping stone from employment.

Educational qualifications' effects on labor market exits appear to be changing across cohorts. College degrees reduce women's chances of exiting in the later cohort. Women with college degrees are highly likely to be married to men with college degrees due to homogamous marriage trends (Blossfeld and Timm 2003) who are most likely to be able to provide for a family on one income. But not only do college degrees mean that women stay in (instead of having no effect or encouraging exit, but marriage also ceases to predict exits for the later cohort. Both of these pieces of evidence together suggest the rise in the dual-earner couple in the 1980s in the United States as women's labor market participation at the professional, knowledge-based level was in greater demand due to globalization forces.

As with marriage, children have no effect on women's exits from employment for the later cohort. For this cohort, a full commodification and life-long employment is a stronger norm than for the previous cohorts.

Upward job-to-job transitions

Initial tests for cohort differences show that for upward mobility, all three cohorts are significantly different from each other (see Table 13.4).

(Table 13.4 about here)

Upward mobility chances depend partly on the duration in the current job: spending two or more years in the current job has a significantly depressing effect on the chance of later upward mobility. But interruptions in the job career have a different effect. A short gap (six months or fewer) can lead to a better job afterwards. But having a gap over 7 months long hurt the chances of upward mobility to the next job.

Labor force context and experience strengthen in relevance across cohorts. The latest birth cohort has lower chances at upward mobility after a longer time in the labor market generally (a stagnation effect) and with a rising number of previous jobs, factors which are not significant for the earlier cohorts. Job turmoil, indicated by the number of previous jobs, hurts upward mobility for the later cohort or is an indicator of difficult-to-employ women who struggle from job to job. Work hours also play a role for the later birth cohort: compared to full-time employees, part-timers find more opportunity for upward mobility. This may be due either to the increased probability of moving up that comes from a lower starting point, or because of the expansion of part time work available for the later-born cohorts.

Some women hold more than one job. For the later cohort, holding a second job increases the chances of upward mobility. Chances are that a woman who takes a second job may be expecting the first one to end or able to choose between the better of the two eventually, and so the second job is the stepping-stone to the next position. As will be seen in the next table, the second job is also a predictor of downward mobility.

Educational characteristics are influencing chances of upward mobility across cohorts, and the flow is in the same direction for the lower and upper levels of education: not having a high school degree is losing power at predicting a lack of upward moves while having at least some college is increasing the probability of upward moves. This reflects the change in the meaning of a high school degree, illustrating that it is, increasingly, not enough to secure stable and upwardly mobile employment. High school degrees for the later cohort are beginning to behave the way no degree once did for the earlier cohort, and some college is carrying the impacts for upward mobility in the later cohort that a high school degree had for the earlier cohort.

Family characteristics, finally, express telling indications of social change in the realm of work and family for women. Especially mothers of the youngest children in the later cohorts are starting to experience lower chances of upward mobility than women with no children at home, compared to earlier cohorts. The employed mothers in the earlier cohort are a biased group – more ambitious or in need of employment than the group of women in the later cohort due to stronger norms of full-time unpaid caregiving. These affects may be related to the rise in maternal employment overall for the later cohort, because the robustness of the effects is the only change.

Cohorts in the South once had advantages in terms of upward mobility chances compared to their northern and Western sisters, but these effects have dwindled for the later cohort. Being African-American has become a more robust indicator of declining chances at upward mobility, an unfortunate signal of the failure of affirmative action programs.

Downward job-to-job transitions

For downward mobility, only the earliest and latest cohorts are statistically significantly different (see Table 13.5).

Table 13.5 about here

Tenure in a job secures current employment and decreases chances of downward moves. Essentially one could say that job tenure tends to stabilize careers, causing them neither to move up nor down. Change across cohorts comes into play when women take interruptions from the labor market. Here, a gap of fewer than 6 months significantly increases the odds that a woman in the later cohort will return to a job that is less prestigious than the one she left. Longer gaps, of over one year, decrease the odds of downward mobility for the earlier cohort, but this effect is declining for the later cohort.

Labor force experience is changing in its effect on downward mobility across cohorts. As with upward mobility, more experience (months in the labor force cumulatively) means a lower likelihood of change for the later cohort. But for this later cohort, having more jobs means a greater chance of downward mobility. Part time work increases downward mobility for the later cohort as well, compared to full-time work. Considering part time work's effect on upward mobility as well, the findings together suggest that this form of employment is a sort of stepping stone to both better and worse jobs for the later cohort. So is holding a second job.

Education influences downward mobility across cohorts identically to the way it influences upward mobility – there is a shift that no high school degree predicts downward moves for all cohorts but the effect is slightly less strong at predicting downward moves for the later cohort, and at least some college and college degrees are gaining in predictive power across cohorts for avoiding downward mobility.

Family and structural location matter only in a few instances: marriage reduces the likelihood of downward mobility, being African American increases the likelihood for the earlier cohort. Mothers of young children in the earlier cohort experience a downward mobility penalty, but this effect disappears by the later cohort. These findings suggest that anti-discrimination legislation has had some impact to protect some groups at least from downward mobility, even if their upward mobility is not yet guaranteed.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Evidence from the comparison of cohorts born almost a decade apart in the middle of the 20th century reveals three trends: evidence of a rise in uncertainty for women's careers, evidence of the erosion of the female homemaker lifestyle for women, and evidence of the consequences of educational expansion.

Evidence in the United States of rising uncertainty includes the fact that activity (more jobs, longer tenure) is riskier over time for upward mobility and for staying in the labor market. Staying in one position, as measured by job tenure and experience, are stabilizing forces that depress subsequent mobility opportunities. Interruptions to jobs hurt women's careers more over time. Variation in the employment career, measured by the presence of part time work and a second simultaneous job, indicate turmoil, more movement up and down the occupational scale. Part time work, furthermore, becomes a stepping-stone out of the labor market for later cohorts.

Female homemaking is in decline in the United States, as evidenced by the fact that marriage ceases to be a reason to exit and instead turns into a marker of labor market stability. Marriage reduces upward and downward moves over time, reduces chances of exits, and increases chances of returns. Perhaps it makes sense that, after the women's movement, marriage would no longer be a reason to exit. But the presence of children is also counterintuitively related to job stability. Over time, children cease to cause downward moves for women but

reduce upward moves. Caregiving thus can be seen as costly but contextualized and managed for the later cohorts.

One striking piece of evidence may point to value change within the United States. For the earlier-born cohort, the number of children used to *increase* odds of entry and *decrease* odds of exit, evidence that women in that cohort who were employed while parenting were doing so out of economic need or ambition. The later cohort is unaffected by the number of children on their job entries and exits, perhaps indicating that the decision for employment in the later-born cohort is based not exclusively on need or ambition but that other factors such as desire to be employed and prior investment in career paths are playing a role. Women's employment in the United States has become a life stage that more and more women participate in, for a longer and longer duration of their adult life courses, regardless of family or marital status.

Educational expansion seems to be affecting women's careers, with the value of specific degree levels shifting in importance: a high school degree protects the later cohort as much as no degree did for the earlier cohort; some college protects as well as high school degrees once did. As more and more women (and men) offer themselves on the labor market with higher and higher degrees, employers can be more and more selective about the degree level of their employees.

Finally, the results presented here indicated that racial and class stratification has more severe consequences over time. Do we see evidence of bifurcation of class structure? In that women without a high school degree have worse chances, and African-American women experience worse labor market chances over time in nearly every category, the picture does not indicate movement toward a classless society. The system seems to be failing some women in the United States in systematic ways.

NOTES

- 1 The last point can be debated, because high mobility is generally accepted in the United States and can make a woman more secure and upwardly mobile. At the height of the technology boom in the 1990s, for example, firms favored workers with more previous jobs because it meant they were more desirable on the labor market. Staying in a job meant stagnating. This would not hold for every industry and might not be true for the earlier cohorts or employment spells, thus this should be a two-tailed test.
- 2 The National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women is sponsored by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and conducted by the Center for Human Resources, Ohio State University.
- 3 Sample weights are not used here because of the difficulty in using weights for a moving and sample with rates of attrition over time. Because I am not making claims to averages in the population but rather speaking about trends in individual women's lives, leaving the data unweighted should not pose a great risk to the results on the connections between women's own circumstances and outcomes.
- 4 One exception, exits from employment, has statistically significant cohort differences only between the middle and later-born cohorts. In this case, the middle and later cohort differences are discussed.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Avellar, S., & Smock, P. J. (2003) Has the Price of Motherhood Declined Over Time? A Cross-Cohort Comparison of the Motherhood Wage Penalty. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 65(3), 597-607.
- Blossfeld, H. P., & Huinink, J. (1991) Human-Capital Investments or Norms of Role Transition? How Womens Schooling and Career Affect the Process of Family Formation. *American Journal of Sociology*, 97(1), 143-168.
- Blossfeld, H.-P., Klijzing, E., Mills, M., & Kurz, K. (Eds.). (2005) *Globalization, Uncertainty, and Youth in Society*. London: Routledge.
- Buchholz, S. & Grunow, D. (2003) Globalization and Women's Employment in West Germany. GLOBALIFE Working Paper No. 47, Bamberg.
- Charley, M., & Bradley, K. (2002) Equal but separate? A cross-national study of sex segregation in higher education. *American Sociological Review*, 67(4), 573-599.
- Cherlin, A. (1989) The Trends: Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage. In A. S. Skolnick & J. H. Skolnick (Eds.), *Family in Transition* (6 ed., pp. 97-105). Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company.
- Cohen, P. N., & Bianchi, S. M. (1999) Marriage, Children, and Women's Employment: What Do We Know? *Monthly Labor Review*, 22-31.
- Coontz, S. (1992) *The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap*. New York: BasicBooks, Inc.
- Dortch, S. (1997) Hey Guys: Hit the Books - College Enrollments. *American Demographics*, 12(9), 1-4.
- Ehrenreich, B. (2001) *Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, LCC.
- Erikson, R., & Goldthorpe, J. H. (1993) Introduction: Industrial Society and Social Mobility. In *The Constant Flux: A Study of Class Mobility in Industrial Societies* (pp. 1-27). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1999) *Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fuchs, V. (1988). *Women's Quest for Economic Equality*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Ganzeboom, H. B. G., & Treiman, D. J. (1996) *International Stratification and Mobility File: Conversion Tools* (Electronic Resource). Utrecht: Department of Sociology.
- Guthrie, D., & Roth, L. M. (1999) The state, courts, and maternity policies in US organizations: Specifying institutional mechanisms. *American Sociological Review*, 64(1), 41-63.
- Herring, C., & Wilsonsadberrry, K. R. (1993) Preference or Necessity? Changing Work Roles of Black-and-White Women, 1973-1990. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 55(2), 314-325.
- Hirschl, T. A., Altobelli, J., & Rank, M. R. (2003) Does marriage increase the odds of affluence? Exploring the life course probabilities. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 65(4), 927-938.
- Hofmeister, H., Mills, M. & Blossfeld, H.-P. 2004. Globalization, Uncertainty, and Mid-Career Women's Life Courses: A Theoretical Framework. GLOBALIFE Working Paper No. 45, Bamberg.
- Jacobsen, J. P., & Levin, L. M. (1995). Effects of intermittent labor force attachment on women's earnings. *Monthly Labor Review*, 14-19.
- Kim, K., & Creighton, S. (1999). *Participation in Adult Education in the United States: 1998-1999*. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics 2000-027.

- Leibowitz, A., & Klerman, J. A. (1995) Explaining Changes in Married Mothers Employment over Time. *Demography*, 32(3), 365-378.
- Lelyveld, J. (2001) *How Race is Lived in America*. New York: Times Books.
- Lipset, S. M. (1995) *American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Marler, J. H., & Moen, P. (2002) *Alternative Employment Arrangements: A Gender Perspective*. Paper presented at the Annual Academy of Management Meetings, Denver.
- Marler, J. H., Tolbert, P. S., & Milkovich, G. T. (2003) Alternative Employment Arrangements. In P. Moen (Ed.), *It's about Time: Couples and Careers* (pp. 242-258). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mills, M., & DiPrete, T. (2005) Men's Mobility in the United States. In H. P. Blossfeld, M. Mills & F. Bernardi (Eds.), *Globalization, Uncertainty, and Men in Society*. London: Routledge.
- Stacey, J. (1991) *Brave New Families: Stories of Domestic Upheaval in Late Twentieth Century America*. New York: BasicBooks.
- Stier, H., & Lewin-Epstein, N. (2001) Welfare Regimes, Family-Supportive Policies, and Women's Employment along the Life-Course. *American Journal of Sociology*, 106(6), 1731-1760.
- U.S. Department of Commerce (2000) High school completion rates and number and distribution of 18-through 24-year-old completers not currently enrolled in high school or below, by background characteristics: October 2000. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey.
- U.S. Department of Education (2000) *Percentage of undergraduates with nontraditional characteristics: 1992-93 and 1999-2000*. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS: 2000).
- U.S. Department of Education (2001) *Enrollment in degree-granting institutions, with alternative projections: Fall 1987 to Fall 2012*. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Education Statistics, "Fall Enrollment in Colleges and Universities" surveys, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System surveys, and Enrollment in Degree-Granting Institutions Model.
- U.S. Department of Labor (2002) College Enrollment and Work Activity of 2001 High School Graduates, Table 383: College Enrollment and labor force status of 2000 and 2001 high school completers, by sex and race/ethnicity: October 2000 and October 2001. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
- U.S. Department of Labor (2004) *History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938 - 1996*. Retrieved June 28, 2004, 2004, from <http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/chart.htm>
- Woods, D. R. (2004) Das "adult worker model" in den USA und Großbritannien. In M. Schratzenstaller (Ed.), *Wohlfahrtsstaat und Geschlechterverhältnis im Umbruch: Was kommt nach dem Ernährermodell?* (Vol. 7, pp. 208-233). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Yoon, Y. H., & Waite, L. J. (1994) Converging Employment Patterns of Black, White, and Hispanic Women - Return to Work after 1st Birth. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 56(1), 209-217.

Table 13.1 Explanatory variables and operationalization, National Longitudinal Survey of young U.S. women, panel, surveys from 1968-1991

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>	<i>Update Point</i>
Educational qualification (time-dependent)	Less than high school High school degree, reference Some college College degree or more	The month of May before each survey
Prestige (time-constant per episode)	ISEI score for current job, converted from 1960 and 1980 Census Occupational codes ^a	Monthly
Number of children (time-dependent)	Number of children (including step-children) in the household (Across all spells: Range 0-11, Mode 2)	Halfway between interviews
Age of youngest child (time-dependent)	Preschool (Birth to 5) School age (6 to 13) Teenager (14 to 17)	Halfway between interviews
Marital status (time-dependent)	Married or not married	Monthly
Employment interruption	Duration of employment interruption between two jobs	Monthly
Labor force experience (time-constant)	In months; cumulated along the life course, measured at the beginning of the episode	Monthly
Number of (time-constant)	Measured at the beginning of the previous jobs episode	Monthly
Region	South=1, Non-South=0	Halfway between interviews
Race (time-constant)	African-American=1, all others=0	At 1968 Interview

Notes

- a Ganzeboom, Harry B.G.; Treiman, Donald J., International Stratification and Mobility File: Conversion Tools. Utrecht: Department of Sociology. <http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/hg/ismf>. Date of last revision: Summer 1996.

Table 13.2 Non-employment to job transitions for U.S. women^a

Variable	Cohort 1942-45		Cohort 1946-49		Cohort 1950-53	
	Coeff	Sig.	Coeff	Sig.	Coeff	Sig.
<i>Period-Specific Information</i>						
Months in Interruption less than 6	-2,82	***	-2,33	***	-2,63	***
Months in Interruption 7-12	-1,82	***	-1,79	***	-1,83	***
Months in Interruption 13-24	-1,98	***	-1,91	***	-1,91	***
Months in Interruption 25-36	-2,12	***	-2,28	***	-2,12	***
Months in Interruption 37 or more	-2,77	***	-2,73	***	-2,59	***
<i>Highest Education Obtained</i>						
Less than HS degree	-0,10	***	-0,16	***	-0,15	***
HS degree (ref)						
Some college	0,06	*	0,05	**	0,11	***
College degree	0,25	***	0,12	***	-0,02	
<i>Family Measures</i>						
Married	-0,00		0,02		0,14	***
No children under 18 (ref)						
Youngest child is 0 to 5	0,20	***	0,10	***	0,08	***
Youngest child is 6 to 13	0,05		-0,02		-0,03	
Youngest child is 14 to 17	0,12	*	-0,02		-0,21	**
Number of children	0,05	***	0,08	***	-0,01	
<i>Contextual Measures</i>						
Reside in South	0,03		0,02		0,07	***
African American	-0,08	***	-0,14	***	-0,14	***
<i>Episodes</i>						
Total Episodes	14870		20612		19897	
Censored Episodes	24421		34122		31535	
	9551		13510		11638	
Minus 2*diff Log Likelihood	2865		3442		2671	
Log likelihood (starting values)	-48536		-67816		-65116	
Log likelihood (final estimates)	-47104		-67816		-63780	

Notes

a Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, N=4352. Transition Rate Models; Cohort differences are significant between earliest cohort and each of the other cohorts.

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

Table 13.3 Job to non-employment transitions for U.S. women^a

Variable	Cohort 1942-45		Cohort 1946-49		Cohort 1950-53	
	Coeff	Sig.	Coeff	Sig.	Coeff	Sig.
<i>Period-Specific Information</i>						
Months in job less than 12	-3,45	***	-3,47	***	-3,19	***
Months in job 13-24	-3,67	***	-3,72	***	-3,77	***
Months in job 25-36	-4,03	***	-4,16	***	-4,19	***
Months in job 37 or more	-5,16	***	-5,20	***	-5,23	***
<i>Labor Force Context</i>						
Number of months in LF	-0,01	***	-0,01	***	-0,00	***
Number of jobs	0,09	*	0,02		-0,01	
ISEI Prestige Score	-0,02	***	-0,01	***	-0,01	***
ISEI Prestige Score missings	-0,13		0,91	***	0,88	***
Full time 35 or more (ref)						
Part time (1-34 hours)	0,16		0,34	***	0,29	***
Hours missing	-0,35	*	-0,34	***	-0,21	*
<i>Highest Education Obtained</i>						
Less than HS degree	0,26	**	0,11		-0,11	
HS degree (ref)						
Some college	0,06		0,00		0,02	
College degree	0,32	***	0,12		-0,20	**
<i>Family Measures</i>						
Married	0,24	**	0,15	***	0,04	
No children under 18 (ref)						
Youngest child is 0 to 5	0,33	***	0,20	*	-0,09	
Youngest child is 6 to 17	-0,14		-0,24	**	-0,04	
Number of children	-0,09	*	-0,13	***	0,00	
<i>Contextual Measures</i>						
Reside in South	-0,21	**	-0,05		0,04	
African American	-0,09		-0,07		-0,13	*
	816		1935		1970	
<i>Episodes</i>						
Total Episodes	15924		34488		36539	
Censored Episodes	15108		32553		34569	
Minus 2*diff Log Likelihood	580		1320		1582	
Log likelihood (starting values)	-4609		-10773		-11110	
Log likelihood (final estimates)	-4319		-10113		-10319	

Notes

a Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women; N= 4413. Transition Rate Models; Cohort differences are significant between middle and latest cohorts.

* p < 0.05

** p < 0.01

*** p < 0.001

Table 13.4 Predictors of upward job to job transitions for women in the United States^a

	Cohort 1942-45		Cohort 1946-49		Cohort 1950-53	
	Coeff	Sig.	Coeff	Sig.	Coeff	Sig.
Constant	-2,65	***	-2,60	***	-2,58	***
<i>Period-Specific Information</i>						
Months in job less than 12 (ref)						
Months in job 13-24	-0,20		-0,06		-0,01	
Months in job 25-36	-1,01	***	-0,90	***	-0,82	***
Months in job 37 or more	-1,78	***	-1,79	***	-1,78	***
Months in Gap less than 6	-0,03		0,28	**	0,05	
Months in Gap 6-12	-0,43		-0,39	**	-0,25	*
Months in Gap 13 or more	-0,84	***	-0,57	***	-0,66	***
<i>Labor Force Context</i>						
ISEI Prestige Score	-0,05	***	-0,05	***	-0,05	***
ISEI Prestige Score missings	-0,67		-0,08		0,15	
Number of months in LF	-0,00		-0,00		-0,00	**
Number of jobs	0,02		0,01		-0,05	*
Full time 35 or more (ref)						
Part time (1-34 hours)	0,02		0,15	**	0,23	***
Hours missing	0,10		-0,26		-0,12	
Holding a second job	0,16		0,07		0,45	***
<i>Highest Education Obtained</i>						
Less than HS degree	-0,59	***	-0,39	***	-0,13	*
HS degree (ref)						
Some college	0,15		0,43	***	0,21	***
College degree	0,42	***	0,78	***	0,60	***
<i>Family Measures</i>						
Married	-0,12		-0,15	*	-0,12	*
No children under 18 (ref)						
Youngest child is 0 to 5	-0,12		-0,20	*	-0,35	***
Youngest child is 6 to 13	-0,02		0,14		0,11	
Youngest child is 14 to 17	0,02		0,23		-0,22	
Number of children	0,07		0,02		0,02	
<i>Contextual Measures</i>						
Reside in South	0,18	*	0,12	**	0,04	
African American	-0,24	*	-0,30	**	-0,37	***
<i>Episodes</i>						
Total Episodes	585		1435		1790	
Censored Episodes	22622		48947		51801	
	22037		47512		50011	
Minus 2*diff Log Likelihood	484		1256		1594	
Log likelihood (starting values)	-3731		-8978		-10963	
Log likelihood (final estimates)	-3489		-8350		-10166	

Notes

a Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, N=4413, Exponential Models; Cohort differences for upward mobility are significant.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 13.5 Predictors of downward job to job transitions for U.S. women^a

	Cohort 1942-45		Cohort 1946-49		Cohort 1950-53	
	Coeff	Sig.	Coeff	Sig.	Coeff	Sig.
Constant	-7,44	***	-7,13	***	-7,14	***
<i>Period-Specific Information</i>						
Months in job less than 12 (ref)						
Months in job 13-24	-0,09		-0,27	**	-0,13	
Months in job 25-36	-0,69	***	-0,83	***	-0,85	***
Months in job 37 or more	-1,86	***	-1,86	***	-1,59	***
Months in Gap less than 6	0,38		0,53	***	0,45	***
Months in Gap 6-12	0,25		0,17		-0,07	
Months in Gap 13 or more	-0,58	***	-0,38	***	-0,19	*
<i>Labor Force Context</i>						
ISEI Prestige Score	0,05	***	0,05	***	0,04	***
ISEI Prestige Score missings	-0,76		-0,05		-0,23	
Number of months in LF	0,00		0,00		0,00	***
Number of jobs	-0,03		0,04		0,14	***
Full time 35 or more (ref)						
Part time (1-34 hours)	0,13		0,28	***	0,23	***
Hours missing	-0,36		0,09		0,14	
Holding a second job	0,27		0,30		0,38	**
<i>Highest Education Obtained</i>						
Less than HS degree	0,50	***	0,53	***	0,25	***
HS degree (ref)						
Some college	-0,18		-0,24	**	-0,22	**
College degree	-0,66	***	-0,89	***	-0,67	***
<i>Family Measures</i>						
Married	-0,18		-0,28	***	-0,18	**
No children under 18 (ref)						
Youngest child is 0 to 5	0,03	***	-0,33	***	-0,20	
Youngest child is 6 to 13	-0,06		-0,28	*	0,07	
Youngest child is 14 to 17	0,16		-0,04		0,05	
Number of children	0,08		0,10	*	0,05	
<i>Contextual Measures</i>						
Reside in South	-0,11		0,03		0,11	
African American	0,34	**	0,15		0,08	
<i>Episodes</i>						
Total Episodes	392		966		1073	
Censored Episodes	21616		47006		49837	
	21224		46040		48764	
Minus 2*diff Log Likelihood	301		759		690	
Log likelihood (starting values)	-2639		-6387		-7081	
Log likelihood (final estimates)	-2489		-6007		-6736	

Notes

a Source: National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women; N=4413. Exponential Models; Cohort differences are significant for earliest and latest cohorts.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001